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STANDING: SUITS AGAINST FEDERAL REGULATORY
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES-INVESTMENT
COMPANY INSTITUTE v. CAMP
In 1962, 1 regulatory responsibility for the fiduciary activities of
national banks was transferred from the Federal Reserve Board to the
Comptroller of the Currency (Comptroller). 2 Since that time the
Comptroller has exercised authority under the Federal Reserve Act to
grant national banks, by special permit, the authority to exercise trust
and other fiduciary powers. 5 In April, 1963, the Comptroller issued
revised Regulation 9 which, for the first time, permitted national banks
to commingle managing agency accounts as an aspect of their fiduciary
powers.4 Pursuant to this regulation,5 the First National City Bank of
New York (Citibank) obtained the Comptroller's approval to organize
and operate a commingled managing agency account, thus marking the
entry of national banks into the mutual fund industry : 3 Fearing the
competitive impact of this move, the Investment Company Institute
(ICI) brought suit against the Comptroller and Citibank, praying for
a declaratory judgment invalidating so much of the Comptroller's Reg-
ulation 9 as permitted national banks to operate this type of account. 7
1 Prior to 1962 statutory authority for the regulation of the fidudary activities of
national banks was vested in the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Federal Reserve Act of 1913, ch. 6 § 10(k), 38 Stat. 151, 262 (1913), as amended, 12
U.S.C. § 248(k) (1970). The statute as amended permits the Board to assign any of
its functions, except those relating to rulemaking or pertaining principally to monetary
and credit policies, to one or more hearing examiners, members or employees of the
Board, or Federal Reserve Banks.
2
 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1970).
8 12 U.S.C. § 92a(j) (1970) provides that the Comptroller is authorized to issue
such rules as he deems necessary to enforce the proper exercise of those powers.
4 Sec 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1971). In addition to the types of collective investment funds
permitted under the prior regulation this revision provided that national banks were
authorized to invest funds held in collective investment accounts. 12 C.F.R. 9.18(a)
(3) (1971). Moreover, the revised regulation allowed the Comptroller to approve
collective investment of such funds in a manner other than those expressly provided
by Regulation 9. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(c) (5) (1971).
6 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1971). Since the fund was to be regulated by both securities and
banking laws, the Bank's offering of the plan required the prior approval of three
agencies: the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Board, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The controlling statutes for securities regulation
are the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. MI 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970), and
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970). The relevant banking statute
is the Glass Steagall Act of 1933, 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 Subd. Seventh, 78, 377-78 (1970).
6 For a history of Citibank's fund, see generally Hearings on S. 2704 Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966);
see also Note, Commingled Trust Funds and Variable Annuities: Uniform Federal
Regulation of Investment Funds Operated by Banks and Insurance Companies, 82
Harv. L. Rev. 435 (1968); Comment, Banks, Trusts and Investment Companies: The
Commingled Investment Funds, 115• U. Pa. L. Rev. 1276 (1967); Comment, Of Banks
and Mutual Funds: The Collective Investment Trust, 20 Sw. L. J. 334 (1966). • • ' -•
7 The scope of this comment is limited to the implications of the Court's holding
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The Comptroller .responded by challenging the standing of ICI, a
national association of mutual'funds and their investment advisors and
underwriters, contending that mere competitive injury caused by fed-
erally authorized action does not, without more, confer standing upon
the injured party.
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that ICI
had standing as an implied beneficiary of the banking laws 8 and inval-
idated the challenged regulatiOn because it allowed national banks to
engage in the securities investment business in direct contravention of
on the issue of standing in /C/. The following outline of the issues raised on the merits
is provided for the purpose of background.
In defense of Regulation 9, the Comptroller argued that: 1) Citibank's fund as
organized under Regulation 9 constituted the fiduciary relationship required under the
banking statutes; 2) Sections 16, 21, 20 and 32 of the Glass Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C.
H 24 Subd. Seventh, 78, 377-78 (1970), while prohibiting national banks from engaging
directly in the securities business or affiliating with organizations dealing in securities, apply
only where banks invest depositors' funds and thus are not controlling when a bank estab-
lishes a fund similar to Citibank's in which customers purchase "units of participation" in
an account to be managed by their bank; 3) any danger of aggressive use of the fund by
Citibank was minimal since, unlike a mutual fund plan, the bank received only a set
fee for managing the fund instead of a "sales load" or the charge normally required of
a customer on initiation in the mutual fund. Furthermore, there was no redemption
charge to customers in the fund comparable to the fee paid by mutual fund investors
when they sell their fund shares.
The District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that: 1) the relationship
between the bank and an individual participant in the fund was that of agent-principal
and not that of beneficiary-trustee as required under the Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.
H 92 a (a), (j) (1970). Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 639 -40
(D.D.C. 1967). Although § 92a(j) does allow a national bank to offer the same fiduciary
services to customers that a local state bank might offer, the relevant New York statutes
do not authorize a state bank to operate a commingled managing agency account. Id. at
641; 2) the units of participation issued were securities which Citibank, as a national
bank, was prohibited from selling under §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass Steagall Act of 1933,
12 U.S.C. §§ 24, Subd. Seventh, 378 (1970). Id. at 645-47; 3) the bank's affiliation
with the commingled account was prohibited by §§ 20 and 32 of the Act, 12 U.S.C.
378, 78. Id. at 644-45, 647-48 (1970).
On an appeal by the Comptroller, the court of appeals reversed the district court on
the merits, ruling that the Glass Steagall Act was designed to prohibit bank investment
of depositor funds and thus that it did not apply where the bank invested funds as a
managing agent of customer funds in a commingled account. 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir.
1969). The Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari held that the operation of
a collective investment fund of the kind approved by the Comptroller, that is, in direct
competition with the mutual fund industry, involves a bank in the underwriting, issuing,
selling and distributing of securities in violation of §§ 16 and 21 of the Glass Steagall
Act. Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
For a background of the issues raised on the merits, see Comment, NASD v. SEC—
Standing to Sue, Economic Power, Banks and Mutual Funds, 55 Va. L. Rev. 1493
(1969) ; Note, 44 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1135 (1969).
8 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624, 636 (D.D.C. 1967).
The court found in the Glass Steagall Act "a clear Congressional policy which sought
to separate national commercial banking from the securities business. . • . This competi-
tion is illegal in the sense that Congress has indicated its policy of separating the two
financial institutions and this Regulation allows in an indirect manner a joinder of these
interests. The plaintiffs were the recipients by implication of Congressional protection."
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the Glass Steagall Act of 1933. 9 On appeal by the Comptroller, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the
lower court on the issue of standing," apparently reasoning that, since
ICI was the only party likely to contest the Comptroller's order, the
importance of a decision on the merits compelled a finding of standing
to vindicate the public interest." However, the appellate court reversed
the district court's decision on the merits, holding that the administra-
tive actions were fully consonant with the regulatory purposes of the
Glass Steagall Act." On certiorari, the ,United States Supreme Court
held that ICI had standing to challenge the validity of Regulation 9
and that the regulation was invalid." The rationale of the Court's hold-
ing on the issue of standing was that: 1) ICI had suffered injury in
fact from the competition of the banks; 2) Congress had arguably
legislated against the competition which ICI challenged; and 3) Con-
gress had not intended to proscribe judicial review of the challenged
federal agency action. 14
The ICI test for standing, if literally interpreted, represents a
shift from the Court's longheld position that "economic injury which
results from lawful competition cannot, in and of itself, confer standing
on the injured business to question the legality of any aspect of its
competitor's operations."" Previously, a competitor had standing in
suits of this nature only when the statutory provision invoked reflected
a legislative purpose to protect a competitive interest, that is, only
when the injured interest was a legally protected interest." To support
0 See note 7 supra,
10 National Ass'n of Securities Dealers v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969). NASD
had intervened before the Securities and Exchange Commission to oppose the grant to
Citibank's fund of any exemption from the provisions of the Investment Company Act
of 1940. After the SEC granted the exemption, NASD sought review in the District of
Columbia Circuit. On review, the case was consolidated  with ICI.
11 The majority opinion of the court, a per curiam statement, was accompanied by
the concurring opinions of Chief Judge Bazelon and Judge Burger (now Mr. Chief
Justice Burger). Judge Bazelon admitted that ICI could meet none of the traditional
criteria of standing in suits against federal regulatory and administrative agencies. How-
ever, he found that standing should be granted to ICI since it was the most likely
petitioner to assert the public interest in the enforcement of the Glass Steagall Act. 420
F.2d at 100. Judge Burger, with whom Judge Miller concurred, disagreed with the
rationale of the Bazelon opinion but agreed that ICI should be granted standing be-
cause of the substantial issues presented in the case. 420 F.2d at 108.
12
 420 F.2d at 84. The court's per curiam opinion simply stated that the
actions of the SEC and the Comptroller were fully consonant "with the statutes com-
mitted to their regulatory jurisdictions." A full discussion of the merits is contained in
Chief Judge Bazelon's concurring opinion. 420 F.2d at 85-95. See also note 7 supra.
18 Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
14 Id. at 620-21.
13
 Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1, 5 (1968), reiterating a proposition
stated as early as Railroad Co. v. Ellerman, 105 U.S. 166, 173 (1881).
10
 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. T.V.A., 306 U.S. 118 (1939), see text at p. 294 infra.
F.C.C. v. Sanders Bros Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940), see text at pp. 294-95 infra.
Hardin v. Kentucky Util. Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), see text at pp. 296-97 infra. Cf. Chicago
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this new test of standing, the Court cited its recent.decision - in Associa-
tion of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp which
held that a complainant had standing if he were "arguably within the
zone of interests protected by a statute!'" However, the Data Pro-
cessing test appeared to be a mere modification of the legal interest
approach to standing rather than the generically different and substan-
tially broader test set forth in ICI. While neither the Data Processing
nor the /C/ test for standing is without ambiguity, they both clearly
represent a trend "toward enlargement of the class of people who may
protest administrative action."" This comment analyzes the develop-
ment in this area of the law beginning with Data Processing and cul-
minating in ICI. It concludes that standing is now assured to persons
who sustain competitive injury resulting from arguably unauthorized
administrative action, provided that judicial review of the challenged
action is by statute neither expressly precluded nor limited to a class
of persons of which the petitioner is not a member.
I. THE PRE-Data Processing DECISIONS
Traditionally, the doctrine of standing has posed a formidable ob-
stacle to suits brought against officials of federal regulatory and admin-
istrative agencies. Plaintiffs suffering injury as a result of allegedly
unauthorized federal agency action have been consistently denied ju-
dicial review on the basis of this "complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction . ."" As a result, actions of the various federal agencies
have remained essentially insulated from judicial review 2 0 The restric-
tions imposed by the concept of standing derive from the constitutional
requirement that federal courts limit their jurisdiction to ".cases" and
v. Atchinson, T. & S.F. Ry. . Co:, 357 U.S. 77'.(1958) .; involving two _CoMpetitOrs one of
whom alleged that the other was operating"illegally because it had not complied with
Certain licensing requirements iMPosed . by the city of ChiCago. The Court held that the
plaintiff had the necessary "personal ,interest in the outcome" to create .a controversy,
and thus had standing. It was enough - that the.Plaintiff hid sustained injury in fact from
competitive activity which was allegedly" violative . Of a licensing statute designed to pro-
mote public safety. 357 U.S. at 83-4. • '
17 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
18 Id. at 154.
• 10 United'States ex rel. Chapman v. F.P.C., 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
20 E.g., Sierra Club v.Nov.ickel, 433.'F.2c1 24 (9th Cir. 1970), petition_ for cert. filed;
39 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. V 15, 1970) (No: 939) (conservation group lacks standing to
challenge construction of ski resort on national forest, land); South Hill Neighborhood
Men, Inc. v. Romney, 421 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.. 1970) - (groups intereited in 'preservation
of historic landmarks denied standing). Commentators have noted the prohibitiie effect
of standing requirements on plaintiffs seeking judicial review of the failure of federal
administrators to enforce housing regulations. See Comment, Judicial 'Review in Urban
Renewal Cases:- donCepti and Consequences, 57 'Geo. L•. 615 (1969)4 N6te, Protecting
the Standing of Renewal •
 Site Families to Seell.Review of ComMunity Relocation Plan-
ning, 73 Yale L.J. 1080 (1964). Similar difficultS, has been ,encountered by'environmental
interest groups in suits against federal agencies. See Comment, Standing of Conservation
Organizations to •Challenge Federal Administrative Action in Federal Court, 12 B.C:Ind.
& Corn. L. Rev. 637 (1971).
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"controversies.'"' This requirement is satisfied when a plaintiff estab-
lishes a personal interest in the outcome of the controversy,-thus assur-
ing the concrete adverseness upon which courts rely for illumination
of the issues presented." ..However, largely as a matter of judicial re-
straint, the Supreme Court has generally required something more to
satisfy the standing requirement where a person seeks review of
federal agency action." In addition to the requisite personal stake, a
plaintiff has generally been required to demonstrate that he has suf-
fered injury to a legally protected interest or that he has standing to
sue in the public interest. 24 However, whether the plaintiff sought to
establish standing under the legal interest theory or by asserting the
public interest, the chances of reaching the merits of the case were
often minimal because of the limited grant of standing afforded under
either approach.
The legal interest theory, typically, has required a complainant
to show either that his claim arose from a common law contract or
property right or that his standing was "founded on a statute which
confers a privilege!'" An action brought in the public interest has usu-
ally been predicated on a statutory provision allowing "any . . . person
. aggrieved or whose interest is adversely affected by federal agency
action" to bring suit." However, even under this theory a complainant
21 U.S. Const. art. III,	 2. The basic justification for the existence of standing is
that it staves off judicial involvement in political questions, advisory opinions, friendly
or collusive suits, and avoids . unnecessary interference with governmentally delegated
functions. See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 22,01 et seq. (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Davis1; L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, chs.
12-13 (1965). See also Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, The Supreme Court, 1960
22 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83,
101 (1968) which involved the standing of a taxpayer to challenge a federal program
providing financial assistance to parochial schools. The Court required the plaintiff to
show both a logical nexus between his status as a taxpayer and the specific constitutional
limitation on the congressional taxing and spending power, as well as injury in fact. Id.
at 102-03. For an analysis of Flast, see Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35
U. Chi, L. Rev. 63, 224-31 (1968).
23 Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 468-69 (1970).
The reason advanced for. requiring additional standing criteria in competitors' suits such
as that in ICI is that stringent standing requirements prevent disruption of the federal
administrative process by businesses alleging illegality of any federal agency action which
affords a competitor a comparative advantage. See, e.g., Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes,
302 U.S. 464, 466-67 (1938); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Dillon, 335 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir.
1964); see also Jaffe, Standing To Secure Judicial Review: Private Actions, 75 Harv.
L. Rev. 255 (1961).
24 For a discussion of these standing criteria see generally, 3 Davis, supra note 21,
at 22.04-.05; 22.01, 22.11; L: Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action; ells.
12-13 (1965):
25 Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). See also note
24 supra.
n • 20 E.g., the Federal Communications Act I 402(b)(2), 47 U.S.C. 402(b)(6) (1970),
provides judicial review for persons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected
by any order of the Commission granting or denying [an] . . . application." The
"person aggrieved" provisions have spawned' a number of decisions on standing. See
Comment, Competitors Standing- to Challenge Administrative 'Action—Recent Federal
Developments, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 807, 815-20 (1970).
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has been required to show a specific congressional authorization to sue.
The legal interest test, as originally conceived in Tennessee Electric
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 27 was marked by ambiguity
and fallacious reasoning. In Tennessee Power, nineteen power compa-
nies challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity (TVA). Although recognizing the severe financial injury which the
plaintiffs would sustain due to governmentally created competition in
the business of electrical power supply, the Court held that the plain-
tiffs did not have standing to challenge federal agency action because
they could not demonstrate that their legal rights had been violated."
The problem with the legal interest concept of standing is that the
controversy in most law suits is precisely this point—whether the
plaintiff has a legally protected interest or right which the defendant
has invaded or has threatened to invade. Thus, under the legal interest
theory, the courts and the parties were embroiled in the merits of the
case within the context of the standing issue. Commenting on the judi-
cial reasoning spawned by Tennessee Power, one authority has ob-
served that:
A plaintiff who seeks to challenge governmental action always
has standing if a legal right of the plaintiff is at stake. When
a legal right of the plaintiff is not at stake, a plaintiff some-
times has standing and sometimes lacks standing. Circular
reasoning is very common, for one of the questions asked in
order to determine whether a plaintiff has standing is whether
the plaintiff has a legal right, but the question whether the
plaintiff has a legal right is the final conclusion. . . "
Within three years after Tennessee Power, the Court was again
faced with a "competitors" lawsuit in which the plaintiff complained
of economic injury and unauthorized federal agency action, but in
which he could not demonstrate a legally protected right. Because of
the restrictive nature of the Tennessee Power decision" the Court
found it necessary to recognize an alternative means of granting stand-
ing to persons who did not meet the legal interest test. In FCC v.
Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 3' the petitioner was an owner of a
radio station and a licensee under the Federal Communications Act
(FCA). He claimed that a Federal Communications Commission grant
21 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
28 Id. In defining a "legally protected interest" the Court was particularly careful
to note that the plaintiff's competitive injury, regardless of its substantiality, did not
qualify as a protected legal interest. The Court denied standing despite allegations that
the federal agency action in question was unauthorized. Id.
20 3 Davis, supra note 21, at 217.
80 Professor Davis has called the Tennessee -Power test "palpably false" concluding
that "[ill this proposition were the law, then no one could challenge a statute out-
lawing the Baptist Church, or prohibiting Republican speeches, or denying criminal
defendants a jury trial, or authorizing unlawful searches, or compelling witnesses to
testify against themselves." K. Davis, Administrative Law Text, 401 (1959).
81 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
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of an operating license to a competitor was illegal per se because it
caused competitive injury to an existing Iicensee—the petitioner. The
Court found that the petitioner had not suffered injury to a legally
protected interest but nevertheless held that he did have standing to
sue in the public interest. To resolve the issue of standing, the Court
looked to Section 402 (b) (6) of the FCA, which provides for the right
of appeal "by any . . . person . . . aggrieved or whose interests are
adversely affected by any order of the Commission granting or denying
any application . . . [for an operating license]." 82 The Court construed
this provision as a congressional grant of standing to sue in the public
interest:
Congress . . . may have been of [the] opinion that one likely
to be financially injured by the issue of a license would be the
only person having a sufficient interest to bring to the atten-
tion of the . . . court errors of law in the action of the Com-
mission in granting the license. It is within the power of
Congress to confer such standing . . . . "33
Thus in Sanders the Court opened a new, albeit narrow, avenue to suits
challenging federal regulatory action. Under Sanders a plaintiff has
standing in such a suit when he can demonstrate injury in fact and
when the controlling legislation expressly provides for judicial review
but does not prescribe the class of qualified complainants.
In 1946, it appeared that Congress had significantly expanded the
legal interest test when it enacted the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)." Section 10(a) of the APA, on its face, purported to grant
standing to anyone aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
a relevant statute." Moreover, the legislative history indicated that
section 10(a) was intended to promote judicial review of federal
agency action by granting standing to persons adversely affected by
such agency action where the pertinent regulatory legislation did not
contain express review provisions." However, the courts, since Kansas
City Power & Light Co. v. McKay," have consistently interpreted the
section as a mere codification of the legal interest test.
82 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970).
33 309 U.S. at 477.
34
 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, §§ 701-06 (1970). See §§ 701-06 which are pertinent to
judicial review.
as APA § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Section 10(a) provides: "A person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by
agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof."
as "This subsection confers a right of review upon any person adversely affected
in fact by agency action or aggrieved within the meaning of any statute." S. Doc.
No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 212, 276 (1946). For a vigorous argument that APA
Section 20(a) should carry this interpretation, see 3 Davis, supra note 21, at 211-13.
See also Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450, 465-68 (1970);
Comment, Standing to Challenge Unlawful Competition Under the National Bank Act,
10 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 421, 431-35 (1969).
717 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955). The D.C. Circuit
295
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
In McKay, under a fact situation substantially similar to that of
Tennessee Power," the plaintiffs claimed standing contending that
they were parties aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
Section 10(a) of the APA. Since Tennessee Power had held that com-
petitors in the plaintiffs' position had no right to sue, the plaintiffs
argued, in effect, that the APA's provision for judicial review supplied
an independent basis for standing. The court, however, took a far more
restrictive view. Referring to the language of section 10(a) as "terms
of art,”" the court held that the section was enacted "for the benefit
of 'any person suffering legal wrong,' that is, one whose legal rights
have been violated."" Thus, the McKay court interpreted the section
as merely a restatement of existing law, and required a showing that
either a legal right had been violated (Tennessee Power) or that an
express review provision was part of the statutory scheme (Sanders)
as prerequisite to a challenge of a federal regulatory or administrative
action." The McKay interpretation of section 10(a) has received gen-
eral judicial acceptance. While there is a growing body of case law to
the contrary, courts have generally regarded the APA as merely a
codification of existing concepts of standing rather than as an expan-
sion of the federal law of standing."
In Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,43 the Supreme Court held
that a petitioner could challenge federal agency action by demonstrat-
ing, through an examination of the legislative history of the relevant
statute, that in enacting the legislation Congress had intended to pro-
tect his interests. The petitioner, a privately owned public utility,
claimed standing to seek an injunction against TVA expansion into an
area which the petitioner was serving. The power company claimed
standing based upon a provision in the TVA Act of 1959 which barred
TVA expansion beyond areas for which the TVA was "the primary
source of power supply on July 1, 1957. . . 2' 4 On the basis of the
legislative history, the Court determined that the petitioner had stand-
ing. The Court found that Congress had enacted the statute primarily
has since reconsidered its interpretation of the APA and has given section 10(a) a
literal application and full recognition of the broad scope of standing the Act provides.
See Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970). However,
the predominant judicial interpretation of section 10(a) remains narrow.
88 As in Tennessee Power, the plaintiffs were a group of electric utility companies
challenging the legality of federal assistance to other electrical utility companies within
the same area that plaintiffs were either servicing or intending to serve. 225 F.2d at 927.
39
 Id, at 932.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 932-34.
42 E.g., "[T)his [aggrieved persons] clause refers only to situations in which a
particular statute expressly confers standing on a person who is adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action under that statute." Harry H. Pierce & Son, Inc. v. Hardin,
299 F. Supp. 557, 562 (N.D. Tex. 1969). See also Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702 (9th
Cir. 1965); Duba v. Schuetzle, 303 F.2d 570 (8th Cir. 1962); Harrison-Halsted Com-
munity Group, Inc. v. Housing and Home Finance Agency, 310 F.2d 99 (7th Cir. 1962).
43 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
44 Tennessee Valley Authority Act of 1933 § 15d(a), 16 U.S.C. 1 831n-4(a) (1970).
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for the purpose of protecting the competitive position of a class of
persons to which the petitioner belonged." Significantly, Kentucky
Utilities did not require the petitioner to show either a protected legal
interest or an express statutory provision conferring standing. How-
ever, the usefulness of the test was seriously limited by the cumbersome
study of legislative history required of the petitioner before the Court
would grant standing.
Thus, prior to Data Processing, the Court had developed the law
of standing in suits against federal agencies essentially within the con-
text of a "legal interest." Although each new test the Court pronounced
provided petitioners new alternatives by which to achieve standing, the
criteria for standing remained characterized, and hence restricted, by
"legal interest" overtones. Plaintiffs were required to demonstrate
either a particular type of injury or evidence of congressional intent
in order to establish standing. Finally, in Association of Data Process-
ing Service Organization, Inc. v. Camp," the Court announced a stan-
dard which, in light of its application in ICI, eliminates the legal
interest requirement previously necessary to a plaintiff's challenge of
federal agency action.
II. THE Data Processing RATIONALE
In Data Processing the Supreme Court held that a competitor has
standing if a) he has suffered injury in fact, b) his interest to be pro-
tected is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute or congressional guarantee in question, and c)
judicial review of the challenged agency action has not been pre-
cluded.47 The complainants in Data Processing sought to challenge a
ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency which permitted national
banks to make data processing services available to other banks and
to bank customers." The complainants satisfied the Article III "cases"
and "controversies" requirement by alleging that the challenged ruling
could cause a loss of future profits and that one of the defendants had
acquired business previously belonging to one of the complainants."
Despite the allegation of economic injury and the questionable validity
of the Comptroller's ruling, the lower courts had denied standing be-
cause the complainants could demonstrate neither a violated legal
interest nor a statutory grant of standing. 5° The Supreme Court re-
45 390 U.S. at 6-7.
46 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
47
 Id. at 153-58.
48 Comptroller's Manual for National Banks 3500 (October 15, 1966), cited in full
by the Court. 397 U.S. at 152.
40 397 U.S. at 152.
150 Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp.
675 (D. Minn. 1968). Essentially, the district court based its holding on a "long and
well established line of judicial authority holding that plaintiffs whose only injury Is
loss due to competition lack standing to maintain legal action to redress their economic
injury." Id. at 678. The circuit court ruled that standing to challenge alleged illegal
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versed, noting that "the existence . . . of a 'legal interest' is a matter
quite distinct from the problem of standing."" The Court summarily
disposed of the "legal interest" test by stating that the test concerns
the merits of the case and not standing. The Court further stated that
the question of standing, apart from the "cases" and "controversies"
test,' is concerned with the question of whether the complainant's
interest is "arguably within the zone of interests . . . protected . . . by
the statute .. . 2'53
Undoubtedly, this new test of standing was designed to enlarge
the class of persons able to challenge federal administrative action."
But whether the Data Processing decision abrogated the legal interest
test entirely or merely modified it by reducing the quantum of proof
required to establish standing was not made clear. The modification
theory is supported by the language of the new test which faintly
echoes the "legal interest" line of decisions. Further support is found
in the Court's discussion of Chicago v. Atcheson, T. & S.F.R. Co.,"
and Hardin v. Kentucky Utilities Co.,°° cases involving statutes which
allegedly protected the complainants against the challenged competi-
tion. Nonetheless, a closer analysis of the decision suggests that the
legal interest test was indeed put to rest. However, the test that peti-
tioner must be "arguably within the zone of interests" establishes a
result but does not set forth the criteria by which achievement of this
result may be ascertained. Nor did the Court elaborate upon the prac-
tical application of this test; rather, the majority simply concluded
that Section 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962 57 "arguably
brings a competitor within the zone of interests protected by it.""
Section 4 of the Act provides that "[il]() bank service corporation
may engage in any activity other than the performance of bank ser-
vices." While arguably designed to protect a bank competitor's eco-
nomic interests, the section does not, on its face, evidence an intent to
protect competitors in general or a specific class thereof. Moreover, it
may be argued from the statutory language that section 4, despite its
competition will attach only where the plaintiffs possess a legal interest or where Congress
has recognized the need for review of administrative action and the plaintiff is so
significantly involved as to be allowed to represent the public. Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 406 F.2d 837, 839-44 (8th Cir. 1969).
et 397 U.S. 150, 153 & n.1.
52
 Id. at 151-52.
53 Id. at 153.
54 The Court noted that "[w]here statutes are concerned, the trend is toward the
enlargement of the class of people who may protest administrative action. The whole
drive for enlarging the category of aggrieved 'persons' is symptomatic of that trend."
397 U.S. at 154. Furthermore, the Court clearly put to rest the notion of a presumption
against judicial review, "unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme."
397 U.S. at 157.
5 357 U.S. 77 (1968).
58 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
57
 Bank Service Corporation Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 1132, codified at 12 U.S.C.
1 1864 (1970).
58 397 U.S. at 156.
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anticompetitive effects, was enacted in order to limit banks to banking
functions." However, the Court refused to inquire further into the
matter because to do so would "implicate the merits."" Thus the net
effect of the decision is that a competitive interest is arguably within
the zone of interests protected by a statute if the injury results from
competitive activity which is arguably prohibited by the statute. Al-
though this interpretation of the decision requires something more than
injury in fact in order to establish standing, a "legal interest" no
longer need be shown, at least as the phrase has been previously un-
derstood. While this expansive reading of the Data Processing case
seems justified, the Court appeared immediately to withdraw to a
modified legal interest theory of standing in the companion case of
Barlow v. Collins.'
In Barlow, a group of cash-rent tenant farmers challenged an
amendatory regulation promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture
which permitted the tenants to assign their right to government subsidy
payments as security for the rental payments of the land which they
leased." The subsidies were paid pursuant to the upland cotton pro-
gram, enacted as part of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965
(FAA)." The relevant statutory provision permitted the assignment
of payments only "as security for cash or advances to finance making
a crop." Prior to 1966, "making a crop" was defined by regulation to
exclude assignments securing the cash rent for a farm." Under this
regulation, tenant farmers were able to form cooperatives in order to
purchase the necessary supplies at the best available price. The regula-
tion, as amended, deleted the exclusion and expressly permitted assign-
ments to secure cash rent." As a result, the landlords were permitted
to demand advance assignment of subsidy benefits as a condition to
leasing the land. Upon assignment, the tenants lost their only security
and thus were unable to obtain the financing needed for farming from
anyone except the landlords. Now captive consumers, the tenants were
59 This inference is supported by the Court's analysis and primary reliance on the
First Circuit's reading of § 4 in Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147, 1153
(1st Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 987 (1970). Quoting the First Circuit the Court
stated:
Section 4 has a broader purpose than regulating only the service corporations.
It was also a response to the fears expressed by a few senators that without
such a prohibition, the bill would have enabled "banks to have engaged in
nonbank activity" . . . and thus constitute "a serious exception to the accepted
public policy which strictly limits banks to banking." . . . We think Congress
has provided the sufficient statutory aid to standing even though the competi-
tion may not be the precise kind Congress legislated against.
397 U.S. at 155.
00 Id. at 156.
01
 Id. at 159.
62 7 C.F.R. § 709.3 (1971).
Section 402(a) of the Food and Agricultural Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 1194, codified
at 7 U.S.C. § 1444 (1970). See 397 U.S. at 160 n.l.
64 20 Fed. Reg. 6512 (1955), discussed by the Court at 397 U.S. at 160-61.
65 7 C.F.R. it 709.3 (1971).
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compelled to pay exorbitant prices and rates of interest in order to
obtain their supplies."
In order to determine whether the tenant farmers had standing
to challenge the Secretary's regulation, the Supreme Court - applied the
test devised in Data Processing. Finding that the tenant farmers had
the requisite personal interest in the outcome, and that they were
clearly included within the zone of interests protected by the FAA,
the Court held affirmatively." In reaching its decision, the Court noted
that the FAA requires the Secretary of Agriculture to "provide ade-
quate safeguards to protect the interests of tenants . ' ."68 and, "as far
as practicable, [to] protect the interests of tenants."" Examining the
legislative history of the FAA, the Court found evidence of a "con-
gressional intent to benefit the tenants."" Although this evidence tan-
gentially related to the tenants' ability to assign their subsidy payments,
the Court did not mark this as the "injured interest" of the petitioners
which fell within the zone of interest protected by the FAA. Instead,
the Court indicated that standing was based on congressional concern
for the tenants' welfare rather than on any particular interest they
asserted.n
The Court's scrutiny of the legislative history in order to discover
congressional intent to protect the tenants is strongly reminiscent of
the legal interest theory and seems to indicate that the Data Processing
test in application is merely an expansion of the old test of standing.
As Justices Brennan and White noted in their dissent on the issue of
standing in both Data Processing and Barlow, while the majority had
purportedly rejected the legal interest test, Barlow clearly reflected the
circular reasoning which had discredited the old standard." The ma-
jority's consideration of the legislative history resulted in a direct
implication of the only substantial issue in the case: "does the statutory
language 'making a crop' create a legally protected interest for tenant
farmers in the form of a prohibition against the assignment of their
federal benefits to secure cash rent?""
The ambiguities of the new test, as formulated and applied in
Data Processing and Barlow, were reflected in the opinions of lower
courts applying the new standard. The decisions indicated varying
degrees of acceptance of Data Processing: 1) only an inferential reli-
ance on the new test with the basis of the court's holding essentially
ea 397 U.S. at 163.
67
 Id. at 164.
68 7 U.S.C. § 1444(d) (10) (1970). 397 U.S. at 164.
69
 16 U.S.C. * 590 h(b) (1970). 397 U.S. at 164.
7° 397 U.S. at 164-65.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 168.
78
 Id. Justice Brennan argued that the Court's decision in Mast v. Cohen, 398
U.S. 83 (1968), supported a test of standing which would require only a showing of
"injury in fact." While Justice Brennan acknowledged that Flare was a taxpayer's suit,
he did not find it necessary to distinguish, for the purpose of standing, a suit against
a federal regulatory or administrative agency.
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grounded in an "injury in fact" test and a consideration of the relevant
statutory materials; 74 2) reliance on a status of the petitioner which
could "arguably" qualify his standing; 75 or 3) a liberal application of
the test, granting the plaintiff standing because he had sustained injury
in fact due to federal agency action, and bad asserted that the federal
action was "arguably" unauthorized.78 The problems of definition in
the new test for standing may be attributed, in part, to the fact that
both Data Processing and Barlow were remanded for trial on the mer-
its after the question of standing had been resolved." Had it chosen
74 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) (residents, businessmen and
representatives of private civic organizations in urban renewal areas had standing to
seek injunctive relief against issuance of a contract of insurance or guaranty and against
the execution or performance of a contract for rent supplement payments for an apart-
ment project which was about to be constructed in the renewal area. The court found
that petitioners had suffered and possibly would continue to suffer injury in fact as mem-
bers of a potentially displaced community. The court further found that judicial review
was not denied by relevant legislation. Id. at 818.). Delaware v. Pennsylvania N.Y.
Cent. Transp. Co., 323 F. Supp. 487 (D. Del. 1971) (standing granted to seek injunctive
relief to petitioner alleging injury in fact to the local environment by a dike and fill
operation by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Delaware River. Id. at 492-93.)
Cf. Klanke v. Camp, 320 F. Supp. 1185 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (standing granted to challenge
Comptroller of the Currency's alleged arbitrary and capricious denial of an application
for a national bank charter. The court noted that Data Processing encouraged the en-
largement of the class of petitioners who could challenge allegedly unauthorized activity
of the Comptroller where injury in fact was sustained and judicial review was not
expressly or impliedly precluded in the relevant legislation. Id. at 1187-88.)
75 Nader v. Volpe, 320 F. Supp. 266 (D.D.C. 1970). The court found that plaintiff
bad standing under the Data Processing test to seek an injunction which would restrain
the Dept. of Transportation from granting extensions of the effective date of a federal
motor vehicle safety standard to car manufacturers. According to the court, the purpose
of the controlling statute was to reduce "traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to
persons resulting from traffic accidents." Id. at 269. However, the court apparently
reasoned that plaintiff Nader could assert the public interest because of his position
on the National Motor Vehicles Safety Advisory Council and his status as a national
crusader for automobile safety and not because of the "mere fact that he uses auto-
mobiles. . . ." Id. at 269.
76 Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 433 F.2d 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court
held that corporations which had formerly supplied the government with ball point
pens had standing to challenge an allegedly illegal letter of commitment from the
government to the National Industries for the Blind which guaranteed purchases of
70% of the estimated government's ball point pen requirements. The court held that
the Data Processing standard required that 1) "the party must allege that the challenged
action has caused him injury in fact .. ."; 2) "the agency has acted arbitrarily . . .
or in excess of its statutory authority, so as to injure an interest that is 'arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question . . .'";
3) "there must be no 'clear and convincing' indication of a legislative intent to withold
judicial review." Id. at 1207. See also 131ackhawk Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Driver,
433 F.2d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
77 Under a fact situation strikingly similar to that of Data Processing, the Court
applied the new test in Arnold Tours, Inc. v.. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970), holding that
a group of travel agencies were "arguably" within the zone of interests protected by
g 4 of the Bank Service Corporation Act and thus had standing to challenge a regulation
of the Comptroller of the Currency permitting national banks to offer travel arrangement
services to their customers. The per curiam decision merely applied, without clarifying,
the ambiguous standard of Data Processing and Barlow.
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to hear the merits of the cases, the Court presumably would have dem-
onstrated both the "zone of interests" protected or regulated by the
relevant regulatory statute and the relationship to that zone of the
"injured" interest asserted by the petitioner. Thus, a discussion of the
merits would more precisely illustrate the limits of the new test as well
as its difficulties. Herein lies the significance of Investment Company
Institute v. Camp," in which the Court went to the merits after finding
that the petitioners had standing. Although ICI does not completely
resolve the problems arising from Data Processing, the decision does
eliminate many of the uncertainties of that case.
III. Investment Company Institute v. Camp
In ICI, the Court's treatment of the standing issue was brief. The
Court ruled that the Data Processing test controlled and held that the
petitioners had standing to challenge Regulation 9 because: petitioners
had suffered injury in fact from the competition of the banks; Congress
had arguably legislated against the competition which ICI challenged;
and Congress had not intended to proscribe judicial review." These
criteria for standing clarify the fundamental ambiguity of the Data
Processing standard. Under Data Processing, the plaintiff had to show
that he was "arguably within the zone of interests."" In /CI, where ju-
dicial review had not been expressly precluded by statutes, the plaintiff
had to show that Regulation 9 permitted competition which was argu-
ably unauthorized. Thus, the Court's interpretation of Data Processing
was that a competitor is "arguably within the zone of interests" pro-
tected by a statute if his injury results from federally authorized action
which arguably is beyond the statutory scope of the challenged federal
agency. It is submitted that the ICI interpretation of the Data Process-
ing test indicates a total abrogation by the Court of the legal interest
test. That this is the correct reading of Data Processing is supported
not only by the language used in ICI but, more importantly, by the
Court's interpretation of the legislative history of the Glass Steagall
Act in the decision on the merits of the case.
In a rather extensive treatment of the legislative history of the
Glass Steagall Act, the majority did not uncover any evidence of a
congressional concern for the Investment Company Institute or others
Data Processing and Barlow are discussed in Davis, The Liberalized Law of Stand-
ing, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 450 (1970); Jaffe, Standing Again, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 633 (1971)
(this article also discusses Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp); The Supreme Court, 1969 Term,
84 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 177 (1970) ; Comment, Competitors Standing to Challenge Admin-
istrative Action—Recent Federal Developments, 48 N.C. L. Rev. 807, 826-30 (1970);
Comment, Judicial Review of Agency Action: The Unsettled Law of Standing, 69
Mich. L. Rev. 540 (1971); Note, 23 U. Fla. L. Rev. 206 (1970). For a discussion of
the implications these cases may have for conservation groups, see Comment, Standing
of Conservation Organizations to Challenge Federal Administrative Action in Federal
Court, 12 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 637 (1971).
78
 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
79 Id. at 620-21.
89 See text at pp. 297-99 supra.
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in the same class." indeed, the Court's opinion cited legislative history
which evidenced no more than a congressional concern for the solvency
and security of national banks. The Court noted that in the Glass
Steagall Act Congress
had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle haz-
ards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the busi-
ness of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the
investment banking business either directly or by estab-
lishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments.
This course places new promotional and other pressures on
the bank which in turn creates new temptations."
The focus of the pressures and temptations was upon the relationship
between a national bank and its affiliate collective investment fund.
When the Glass Steagall Act was under consideration in 1933, Con-
gress was concerned about bank involvement in the investment field
for a variety of reasons, including: (a) the possibility of a loss of pub-
lic confidence in a bank should its affiliate fare badly; (b) the temp-
tation on the part of a bank to shore up an affiliate through improvident
loans; (c) the development of a "salesman's interest" by a bank for its
affiliate, i.e., the promotional incentives the bank would have in the
performance of its fund, for, if the fund were less successful than the
traditional mutual funds, the bank would lose the resulting fees; and
(d) the temptation to make credit facilities more freely available both
to investors in the affiliate and to companies whose stock the affiliate
held." Central to the problems which the Glass Steagall Act was in-
tended to prevent was the fear that public confidence in banking insti-
tutions could be destroyed by unsound commercial banking practices.
Thus, in finding that Congress "did legislate against the compe-
tition that the petitioners challenge,"" the Court apparently meant that
Congress not only legislated against the challenged activity but that it
did so, in part, for reasons founded upon the resulting competition.
However, as the legislative history indicates, the prohibitions of the
Glass Steagall Act were designed to keep banks out of, and not to pro-
tect persons within, the securities investment industry." Congress was
81
 In discussing the Glass Steagall Act, the Court did not refer to a congressional
concern to protect the mutual fund industry but discussed only the congressional pro-
hibition on national hank participation in the securities investment market. Furthermore,
the majority never discussed a congressional concern for the stability of the stock market
or the securities investment field in general. The Court observed merely that the fund
"finds itself in direct competition with the mutual fund industry." Id. at 625. The
purpose of this statement was to show the similarities between the collective investment
fund of the Bank and the mutual fund industry, and not to indicate a congressional
intention to protect ICI and those similarly situated from bank competition. Id.
82 Id. at 630-31.
83 Id. at 631-32.
84 Id, at 621.
85
 The Court quoted a statement by Senator Buckley made at the time the Glass
Steagall Act became law:
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not concerned with the impact the added bank competition would have
on the investment field but rather with the ill effects such competition
could have on national banks. The zone of interests to be protected by
the Glass Steagall Act encompassed the interest of the general public
in the promotion and preservation of "prudent and disinterested com-
mercial banking practices which would generate confidence in the com-
mercial banking system." 88 There was nothing in the Court's reading of
the legislative history which indicated a congressional design to protect
the mutual fund industry or any class of persons from bank competi-
tion.87 On the contrary, there existed a clear expression that Congress
intended to minimize the anticompetitive aspects of the Glass Steagall
Act." Thus while Barlow, with its examination of legislative history
supporting the conclusion that the tenant farmers were clearly within
the zone of protected interests, seems to limit the meaning of Data
Processing, the legislative history in /C/ illustrates that the Data
Processing test is applicable even where a statute bears no relation to
competitive injury.
Shortly after the Data Processing decision, one commentator sug-
gested that the Court would move to a standing test requiring only
"injury in fact." 89 Indeed, the Court in ICI seems to have come close
to this proposition. The Court has defined persons "arguably within
the zone of interests" to include everyone alleging injury in fact result-
ing from "arguably" unauthorized regulatory action. However, requir-
ing a complainant to allege that the challenged action is arguably
unauthorized appears to be no more than that required of any plain-
If we want banking service to be strictly banking service, without the expecta-
tion of additional profits in selling something to customers, we must keep the
banks out of the investment security business. 75 Cong. Rec. 9912 (1932).
Id. at 634. The Court then went on to state:
The language that Congress chose to achieve this purpose includes the
prohibitions of § 16 [of the Glass Steagall Act] that a national bank "shall
not underwrite any issue of securities or stock" and shall not purchase "for its
own account . . . any shares of stock of any corporation," and the prohibition
of § 21 [of the Glass Steagall Act] against engaging in "the business of issuing,
underwriting, selling, or distributing . .. stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or
other securities."
Id.
The Court's study of the legislative history surrounding the Glass Steagall Act
further revealed that "[elven before the passage of the Act it was generally believed
that it was improper for a commercial bank to engage in investment banking directly."
Id. at 629.
86 Id. at 634.
87 Justice Harlan emphasized this point•in his dissent: "[TIhe Court cannot mean
. . . that it was Congress' purpose to protect petitioners' class against competitive in-
jury for . . . neither the language of the pertinent provisions of the Glass Steagall Act
nor the legislative history envinces any congressional concern for the interest of peti-
tioners and others like them in freedom from competition." Id. at 640.
88 Id. at 640. Justice Harlan observed that: "[I]t appears reasonably plain that, it
anything, the [Glass Steagall] Act was adopted despite its anticompetitive effects rather
than because of them."
89 Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Chi, L. Rev. 450, 457-58 (1970)
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tiff—Essentially, the complainant is required only to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted. Thus, in suits involving action by agencies
whose regulatory function is concerned with activities affecting the
general public interest, and whose actions are not insulated by statute
from judicial review, nor limited to a particular class of persons, an
allegation of injury in fact should be sufficient to establish standing.
This result is not novel but is fully consonant with the express language
of the standing provision in the Administrative Procedure Act which
the courts, until Data Processing, had interpreted as only a codification
of the legal interest test."
The only remaining obstacle to a trial on the merits in suits where
the relevant statute does not limit standing to a particular class of
petitioners should be congressional prohibition of judicial review of the
challenged federal agency action. This, however, is a question of re-
viewability and not of standing. Moreover, it is well settled that such a
congressional prohibition must be made explicit in the relevant statu-
tory language. In general, judicial review of agency action is the rule
rather than the exception. 91
 Although the approach to the problem of
standing proposed by the ICI decision might be criticized as opening
the old and rusty floodgates of litigation, the ICI test still requires a
plaintiff to show that he has a personal stake in the outcome of the case
and that the activity of which he complains is "arguably" illegal.
Two important questions remain unanswered by the ICI decision.
The first is whether standing will be granted to a plaintiff harmed by
allegedly unauthorized federal agency action where the relevant legis-
lation was designed to protect a class of persons of which the plaintiff
is not a member. Although Justices Brennan and White argued in their
dissenting and concurring opinion to both Data Processing and Barlow
that a simple allegation of injury in fact should be sufficient to establish
standing in a suit brought against a federal agency," it appears that
the application of Data Processing will be limited to cases involving
statutes which (a) do not preclude judicial review and (b) do not
contain a legislative grant of standing. That is, the Data Processing
test as interpreted and applied in ICI will permit judicial review of
federal administrative action in those cases where, prior to Data
Processing, review would not have been possible even though the
pertinent regulatory statute did not preclude review. Thus, ICI should
not be interpreted as an automatic bestowal of standing upon peti-
tioners having a competitive interest adversely affected by federal
agency action. Rather, it should more properly be viewed as the Court's
9G See pp. 295-96 supra.
91 In Data Processing, the Court stated that "[Mere is no presumption against
judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism, unless that purpose is fairly
discernible in the statutory scheme." 397 U.S. at 157. See also Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) and Switchmen's Union of N. America v. National
Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
92 397 U.S. at 167-68. See text accompanying notes 72, 73 supra.
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limited grant of standing to the most likely petitioner, the competitor,
where the public interest is threatened by arguably unauthorized agency
action.
The second question is whether the grant of standing in this
limited situation will be extended to a petitioner who is not a com-
petitor. While competitive harm provided the requisite injury in fact
in both Data Processing and ICI, the Court's discussion of the statutes
involved in each case, as well as their legislative history, failed to
evince any sense of congressional concern for competitors. Indeed, it
appears that the congressional concern in each statute was the public's
interest in the solvency and security of national banks. Furthermore,
Justice Douglas, in writing the Data Processing opinion,. clearly indi-
cated that the zone of interests protected by a regulatory statute could
include " 'aesthetic, conservational, and recreational' as well as eco-
nomic values. . . ."" Thus it would appear that the ICI decision may
have applicability in situations other than the competitor's lawsuit
where groups seek to advance the purely public interest.
CONCLUSION
The standing to sue doctrine has traditionally been an obstacle to
suits brought against federal administrative or regulatory agencies. Al-
though plaintiffs have alleged that unauthorized federal agency action
has caused them injury, courts have consistently denied them judicial
review on the basis of standing. In Data Processing the Supreme Court
reassessed the criteria of standing for suits of this nature and held
that a plaintiff should be required only to allege that the challenged
agency action caused him "injury in fact, economic or otherwise" and
to assert an interest which is "arguably within the zone of interests
protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Al-
though the new test appeared to alter significantly the previous stand-
ing criteria, precisely how and to what degree remained unclear. Much
of this ambiguity has been eliminated by Investment Company Insti-
tute v. Camp, where the Supreme Court held that standing is estab-
lished when a complainant states injury in fact caused by allegedly
illegal but federally authorized competition, and asserts the protection
of regulatory legislation which neither prohibits judicial review nor
limits it to a particular class of petitioners. Thus the Data Processing
test, as applied in ICI, will now assure judicial review of allegedly
unauthorized federal agency action. It is suggested that this is the most
liberal precedent for the determination of standing in suits brought
against federal regulatory or administrative agencies whose enabling
legislation fails to indicate any class of prospective petitioners.
It remains to be seen whether standing will be granted to all
petitioners who sustain injury in fact where the relevant regulatory
legislation does not preclude judicial review. It has been suggested that
93 397 U.S. at 154.
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the Data Processing-ICI line of decisions will have limited applicability
and will serve as precedent for standing in a competitor's suit only
where the pertinent statute does not limit standing to a particular class
of persons. In this limited situation, the important question to be
answered is whether noncompetitors will be able to establish standing
to sue under the Data Processing test. It would appear from dicta in
the Data Processing majority opinion that the new test may indeed be
available in a noncompetitor suit in which the petitioner seeks to
protect the public interest. This prospect, if realized, would be the most
significant ramification of the Data Processing solution to the problems
of standing.
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